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COMMITMENT, RISK, AND CONSUMPTION: DO BIRDS OF A FEATHER
HAVE BIGGER NESTS?
Stephen H. Shore and Todd Sinai*
Abstract—Consumption commitments—goods like housing for which
adjustment is costly—change the relationship between risk and consumption. Commitment provides a motive to reduce consumption when possible future losses are too small to warrant adjustment but not when losses
are large enough that adjustment would be worthwhile. This implies
conditions under which mean-preserving increases in risk can increase
housing consumption. Our empirical evidence exploits the interaction of
these conditions with a novel proxy for unemployment risk: couples
sharing an occupation. Consistent with our model, same-occupation couples consume more housing only when adjustment costs are high and
potential losses are sufficiently large.

I.

Introduction

C

ONVENTIONAL economic wisdom suggests that
households should respond to risk by saving more and
consuming less. However, this precautionary saving intuition follows from the assumption that households can
costlessly adjust their level and mix of consumption (Leland, 1968; Sandmo, 1970; Drèze & Modigliani, 1972;
Kimball, 1990). This simplification is often at odds with
reality, as adjusting the consumption of many goods carries
some transaction cost. For example, to reduce housing
consumption, home owners must incur the costs of selling a
house, buying a new one, and moving. Goods with this
feature are often referred to as consumption commitments.
The empirical literature on precautionary saving has examined how saving, wealth, or consumption varies with risk
but has paid remarkably little attention to adjustment costs.
We show that commitment introduces a motive for saving
in anticipation of small losses in income that is not present
for large losses; this can invert the usual negative precautionary saving relationship between risk and consumption.
By way of intuition, when a household chooses the quantity
of a consumption commitment such as housing, it recognizes that adjusting housing consumption (by moving) will
be optimal only after a large loss. Following a small loss,
the household will instead have to reduce nonhousing con-
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sumption substantially since adjusting housing consumption
will not be warranted. The marginal utilities of housing and
nonhousing consumption will diverge. By reducing housing
consumption ex ante, a household that anticipates the possibility of such losses can mitigate the future divergence of
housing and nonhousing consumption. By contrast, following a loss large enough to make adjustment optimal, moving
will equate the marginal utilities of housing and nonhousing
consumption. Foreseeing this rebalancing, a household that
anticipates the possibility of large prospective losses lacks
this motive for reducing housing consumption ex ante. As a
result, an increase in risk that makes large losses more likely
but small losses less likely can lead to greater housing
consumption.
Using household-level microdata, we find that an increase in risk leads to more housing consumption when
adjustment costs are relatively high but not when they are
low. We bring two empirical innovations to bear on this
question.
First, we exploit a novel source of variation to proxy for
increasing risk. When couples share an occupation, the
correlation of their unemployment events is higher. Couples
with higher unemployment correlations face a higher probability that neither or both spouses will become unemployed
but a lower probability that exactly one spouse will become
unemployed. This approach, which follows much of the
empirical precautionary saving literature in using occupationbased variation in unemployment risk as a proxy for income
risk, enables us to control separately for each spouse’s
occupation and identify the risk solely from the pairing of
couples.
Second, we interact our measure of risk with proxies for
adjustment costs. Identification comes from comparing the
housing consumption of same- and different-occupation
couples when adjustment costs are high versus when they
are low. This controls for the possibility that sameoccupation couples may differ from other couples in dimensions besides risk and that these differences may affect
housing consumption.1 The model predicts that couples with
higher unemployment correlations should consume more
housing only when adjustment costs are large enough to
deter moving. Therefore, we compare home owners (who
1 Lusardi (1997) has raised the concern that the individual-level,
occupation-based proxies for risk used in the precautionary saving literature (Carroll & Samwick, 1997) are prone to omitted variable bias.
People in high-risk occupations differ from other individuals in dimensions other than risk that affect saving and consumption. We control for
this possible individual-level omitted variable bias by controlling for the
occupation of each spouse directly and then exploit variation in withinhousehold diversification. This provides an alternative to the natural
experiment approach used in Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005) to
overcome omitted variable problems.
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have high moving costs) to renters (who do not). We find
that same-occupation home owners spend at least 2.1%
more on their houses than do different-occupation couples.
This result obtains even after controlling for income, each
spouse’s occupation, and a host of other demographic characteristics. By contrast, same-occupation renters spend no
more on rent than do different-occupation renters. This
pattern cannot be explained by same-occupation couples’
selection into home ownership. The relationship between
risk and housing consumption is also more positive when
another measure of moving costs is high. When couples face
effectively higher moving costs because they are unlikely to
move for exogenous demographic reasons (age, education,
presence of children), the difference between same- and
different-occupation home owners’ housing spending is
greater.
The model also predicts that couples with higher unemployment correlations should consume more housing only
when loss magnitudes are large enough to induce moving.
We exploit cross-state variation in the nonlinearity of the
unemployment insurance (UI) schedule. When an unemployed household faces a lower UI replacement rate, the
potential loss to permanent income is greater, raising the
odds of moving. We compare households with more and
less generous unemployment insurance. We find that sameoccupation home owners spend more on housing relative to
different-occupation home owners only when unemployment insurance is less generous.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows.
Section II sets up a simple model of consumption commitments that predicts that a mean-preserving increase in risk
can increase a household’s committed consumption in some
settings but not others. We describe the data in section III
and present results in section IV. Section V. concludes.
II.

Model

In this section, we outline a stylized model of precautionary saving that incorporates consumption commitments.
The model presented here contains standard features of
precautionary saving and consumption commitment models. However, this is the first paper to focus on the implications for precautionary saving of a model with consumption adjustment costs. Chetty and Szeidl (2005) argue that
commitment makes households more risk averse in the
domain of small losses (too small to warrant adjusting
committed consumption) than large ones (large enough to
warrant adjusting committed consumption). This paper argues that this can be true for prudence as well as risk
aversion. Commitment provides an incentive to reduce
housing consumption (and therefore save) relatively more in
anticipation of possible small losses than large ones. In a
setting where adjustment is optimal only in response to
large losses, an increase in risk that makes large losses more
likely but small losses less likely (even one that is meanpreserving by construction) can increase committed con-
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sumption and reduce saving, thus inverting the standard
precautionary saving result.
A. Setup

Following Chetty (2004), we present a model with two
periods, t ⫽ 1, 2, and utility in each period, u(h, f ), a
function of two goods, h (housing) and f (food).2 The
household’s lifetime expected utility is the sum of expected
utility from the two periods:
U ⫽ u共h 1 , f 1 兲 ⫹ E关u共h 2 , f 2 兲兴.

(1)

As in the precautionary saving literature, we treat household labor income risk as exogenous and endogenize consumption and saving. In the first period, the household
receives income Y 1 and decides how much of each good, h 1
and f 1 , to consume. The remainder, Y 1 ⫺ h 1 ⫺ f 1 , is saved.3
In the second period, the household receives an income Ỹ 2
(which is not known in the first period). The household must
then allocate second-period wealth, Y 1 ⫹ Ỹ 2 ⫺ h 1 ⫺ f 1 ,
between the two goods. If a household adjusts its consumption of good h, it pays a fixed transaction cost k. 4 It is this
transaction cost that gives the h good its commitment
feature. Therefore, a household’s intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
Y 1 ⫹ Ỹ 2 ⫽ 2h 1 ⫹ f 1 ⫹ f 2 if h1 ⫽ h2
Y 1 ⫹ Ỹ 2 ⫽ h 1 ⫹ k ⫹ h 2 ⫹ f 1 ⫹ f 2 if h1 ⫽ h2 .

(2)

To determine the optimal consumption in the first period,
we determine optimal consumption and indirect utility in
the second period and then work backward. In the second
period, the household maximizes u(h 2 , f 2 ) subject to constraint (2), taking h 1 and f 1 as given. Assuming that u is
2 Prices are normalized to 1, and there is no goods price risk. u is
assumed to be symmetric, differentiable everywhere, strictly increasing,
and strictly concave. Relaxing the symmetry assumption does not affect
the substance of the results. We require that u hh ⬍ u hf , so that increasing
the quantity of housing consumed reduces the marginal utility of housing
more than the marginal utility of food.
3 A standard user cost model of home ownership transforms the asset
price of the house into the flow cost of the consumption of housing
services, h (Hendershott & Slemrod, 1983; Poterba, 1984). The consensus
of the literature is that the demand for housing is determined by the
consumption motive rather than investment (Henderson & Ioannides,
1983; Goetzmann, 1993; Brueckner, 1997; Flavin & Yamashita, 2002).
Consequently, the dual nature of housing as an asset and consumption
good does not preclude its use as an indicator of consumption. Showing
the conditions under which households might save precautionarily in a
housing asset is beyond the scope of this model. We will come back to this
issue later to make sure a savings motive is not driving our empirical
results. In addition, because we abstract from the investment problems
examined in other work, we make the simplifying assumptions that there
are no risky assets, the riskless interest rate is 0, and the household cannot
save in the housing asset.
4 Fixed transaction costs provide greater analytic tractability than the
case of proportional transaction costs (k ⬀ h 1 ) with no effect on the
qualitative predictions of the model.
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symmetric—u( x, y) ⫽ u( y, x)—for simplicity, optimal
consumption is
1
h 2 ⫽ f 2 ⫽ 共Y 1 ⫹ Ỹ 2 ⫺ h 1 ⫺ f 1 ⫺ k兲 if h2 ⫽ h1
2
(3)
h 2 ⫽ h 1 ; f 2 ⫽ Y 1 ⫹ Ỹ 2 ⫺ 2h 1 ⫺ f 1 if h2 ⫽ h1 ,
and second-period indirect utility, v(Y 1 ⫹ Ỹ 2 ⫺ h 1 ⫺ f 1 ,
h 1 ), a function of second-period wealth and first-period
housing, is

⫽ max

冤

u共21共Y1
1
共Y
2 1

冥

⫹ Ỹ2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k兲, .

(4)

⫹ Ỹ2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k兲)

Adjusting housing consumption is optimal if and only if the
indirect utility from moving (the second term) is greater
than the indirect utility from not moving (the first term). The
household will not adjust housing consumption, h, unless
the shock to income is large enough that the benefit of
rebalancing consumption exceeds the cost of moving.
Once we have solved for the optimal consumption rule in
the second period, we can solve for optimal consumption in
the first period. The household’s lifetime utility function (1)
can be rewritten as
U共h 1 , f 1 兲 ⫽ u共h 1 , f 1 兲

⫹E

冤

冥

max共u共h1 , Y1 ⫹ Ỹ2 ⫺ 2h1 ⫺ f1 兲,
u共21共Y1 ⫹ Ỹ2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k兲,
1
共Y
2 1

⫹ Ỹ2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k兲)

.

(5)

In equation (5), u(h1, f1) is the utility of first-period consumption. The expectation term is the expected utility of secondperiod consumption. Note that second-period utility is the
maximum of the utility from not moving (the first term in the
max operator) and the utility from moving (the second term).
To better understand optimal first-period consumption
{h *1 , f *1 }, we must add structure by making assumptions
about the distribution of Ỹ 2 . We assume that the household
has two wage earners, a husband and wife, and that uncertainty comes from the possibility that one or both may
receive a negative wage shock, which we refer to as becoming unemployed. Income for either husband or wife is Y 2 if
employed and Y 2 ⫺ L if unemployed. The husband’s
probability of unemployment is p, while the wife’s is q.
There is a correlation  between the employment status of
the husband and wife.5 Therefore, the distribution of household income in the second period, Ỹ 2 can be written as:
5 Since unemployment is binomial, the range of possible values of  lies
in the interval
max共 p ⫹ q ⫺ 1,0兲 ⫺ pq min共 p,q兲 ⫺ pq
僆
冑pq共1 ⫺ p兲共1 ⫺ q兲 , 冑pq共1 ⫺ p兲共1 ⫺ q兲 .

冋

Ỹ2 ⫽ 2Y2 with probability 1 ⫺ p ⫺ q ⫹ 
Exactly one spouse unemployed :
Ỹ2 ⫽ 2Y2 ⫺ L with probability p ⫹ q ⫺ 2

(6)

Both spouses unemployed :
Ỹ2 ⫽ 2Y2 ⫺ 2L with probability ,
where  ⬅ pq ⫹  冑pq共1 ⫺ p兲共1 ⫺ q兲.

v共Y 1 ⫹ Ỹ 2 ⫺ h 1 ⫺ f 1 , h 1 兲
u共h1 , Y1 ⫹ Ỹ2 ⫺ 2h1 ⫺ f1 兲,

Both spouses employed :

册

Increasing the correlation of the couple’s unemployment
events  (or, equivalently,  while holding p and q fixed) is
equivalent to adding a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of household labor income, increasing the probability of the best and worst outcomes (neither or both
unemployed) while decreasing the probability of the medium outcome (exactly one unemployed). However, expected household income, E[Ỹ 2 ] ⫽ 2Y 2 ⫺ ( p ⫹ q) L, is
independent of  or .
In this setting, there are three possible states (none, one,
or both unemployed) with two possible adjustment actions
for each (move or do not move) so there are 23 ⫽ 8 possible
patterns of adjustment (for example, move if and only if one
or both spouses become unemployed).
B. Optimal Consumption

In general, it is not possible to solve for the optimal h 1
and f 1 analytically. Instead, we consider the special case in
which unemployment probabilities p and q become arbitrarily small. We also include numerical results with more
realistic unemployment probabilities (10%) and proportional adjustment costs for the empirically plausible case of
separable log utility. These numerical results are similar to
the analytic results. In the appendix, we also present analytic results for quadratic utility without assuming that
unemployment probabilities go to 0. Again, the results are
similar. In all cases, we make the empirically realistic
assumption that unemployment rates ( p and q) are low in
the sense that dual employment is the most common state.
This implies that the distribution of income is negatively
skewed (E[(Ỹ 2 ⫺ E[Ỹ 2 ]) 3 ] ⬍ 0) so that the only relevant
housing adjustments are those that reduce housing consumption.6
Lemma 1. Assume utility u(h, f ) satisfies u( x, y) ⫽
u( y, x), u h , u f ⬎ 0, u hh , u ff ⬍ 0, and u hh , u ff ⬍ u hf and
6 If we considered lottery risk (where the income distribution is positively skewed) instead of income risk (where it is negatively skewed), one
possible increase in risk would increase the probability of winning a
lottery large enough to induce moving to a larger house, while decreasing
the probability of winning a lottery too small to induce a move. The model
would then predict even greater reductions in housing consumption than
would be predicted by a model of precautionary saving without consumption commitments. In that case, individuals would adjust consumption in
good states but not bad ones.
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FIGURE 1.—IMPACT

OF

INCREASING H 1 ON LIFETIME EXPECTED UTILITY,
NO MOVING COSTS

0.5

du/dh1, both employed
du(h1,f1*(h1))/dh1

u hhh , u fff are finite for all h, f 僆 [ 41 (Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ) ⫺ 2L,
1
(Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 )]. Also assume Y 1 , Y 2 , and L are strictly
4
positive. In the limit as p and q go to 0, any value of
k 僆 [0, ⬁] lies in one of four nonempty, contiguous
ranges in which adjustment is (a) always optimal, (b)
optimal if and only if at least one spouse becomes
unemployed, (c) optimal if and only if both spouses
become unemployed, and (d) never optimal, where
these ranges are listed in ascending order of k:
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du/dh1, one unemployed

0

du/dh1, both unemployed
E[du/dh1]

-0.5

(a) When k is such that adjustment is always optimal,
dh*

then lim d1 ⱞ 0 if and only if u hhh ⱞ 0. As p, q
p,q30
3 0, this pattern of adjustment is only optimal
for k ⫽ 0.
(b) When k is such that adjustment is optimal if and
only if at least one spouse becomes unemployed;
dh*

then lim d1 ⫽ 0.
p,q30
(c) When k is such that adjustment is optimal if and only

-1
0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

h1
Note: This figure plots the marginal lifetime utility of first-period housing consumption against
first-period housing consumption. There are no moving costs, so k ⫽ 0. First-period income, Y 1 ⫽ 2;
second-period income for a given spouse is either Y 2 ⫽ 1 with probability 1 ⫺ p ⫽ 1 ⫺ q ⫽ 0.9 or
Y z ⫺ L ⫽ 0.5 with probability p ⫽ q ⫽ 0.1. As a result, total household second-period income is 2,
1.5, or 1. The correlation of the household’s unemployment shocks is  ⫽ 0.2. Lifetime utility is given
as the sum of log food and log housing consumption in periods 1 and 2.

dh*

if both spouses become unemployed; then lim d1
p,q30
⬎ 0.
(d) When k is such that adjustment is never optimal;
then lim

dh*1

p,q30 d

Proof.

ⱞ 0 if and only if u hhh ⱞ 0.

See appendix A for the proof and for closed-form

expressions for p,q30
lim

dh*1
d ,

lim

df *1

p,q30 d

and ranges of k.

Cases a and d: Adjustment is always optimal or never
optimal. When adjustment costs are very low (case a) or
very high (case d), the adjustment decision will be the same in
all states. Increasing risk (here, , the covariance of spouses’
unemployment spells) increases or decreases consumption depending on the third derivative of the utility function. When
utility is quadratic (uhhh ⫽ 0), increasing risk has no impact on
consumption. These results are identical to those commonly
found in the precautionary saving literature.
In the case of prudence (u hhh ⬎ 0) considered in standard
precautionary saving models, increasing risk reduces consumption. Marginal utility goes up more than twice as much
when both husband and wife become unemployed than
when only one becomes unemployed. Therefore, increasing
risk (increasing ) raises expected marginal utility and
reduces the optimal level of consumption.
This is illustrated by figure 1, which presents numerical
results for the case of log utility, 10% expected unemployment rates, and no moving costs.7 (The results are qualitatively the same when moving costs are so high that adjustment is never optimal.) The figure shows the marginal
lifetime utility of first-period housing consumption, dU(h 1 ,
7 These plots assume that the level of food consumption in the first
period is chosen optimally given first-period housing consumption and an
unknown second-period employment realization. We use the following
parameters: Y 1 ⫽ 2, Y 2 ⫽ 1, L ⫽ 0.5, p ⫽ q ⫽ 0.1,  ⫽ 0.2, k ⫽ 0.

f *1 (h 1 ))/dh 1 ( y-axis), as a function of initial housing consumption, h 1 ( x-axis) in different unemployment states.
These lines represent the first-order conditions for firstperiod housing in various states if the second-period realization were known. In other words, how does a marginal
increase in first-period housing consumption affect lifetime
utility if both spouses (or one or none) are employed in the
second period? If both the husband and wife are unemployed, represented by the ‚ plot, then the marginal utility
of first-period housing consumption is strongly negative; the
family could have increased lifetime utility had it bought a
smaller house initially. By contrast, if both spouses are
employed, the 䊐 plot, then the marginal utility of firstperiod housing is positive; the family could have increased
lifetime utility had it bought a bigger house initially. The o
plot, representing the marginal utility when exactly one
spouse becomes unemployed, is in between.
Plot ⫹ in this figure is merely an average of the ‚, o, and
䊐 plots, weighted by the respective probabilities of the three
employment outcomes. Since the first-order condition for h 1
is
E关dU共h 1 , f *1 共h 1 兲兲/dh 1 兴 ⫽ 0,

(7)

the optimal level of consumption is simply the point where
the expected marginal utility plot, ⫹, crosses the y-axis. A
mean-preserving spread increases the weight on both the
unemployed and employed states (‚ and 䊐 plots) by reducing the weight on the one unemployed state (o plot).
Because u hhh ⬎ 0, and ‚ plot (both unemployed) is
substantially lower than the o plot (one unemployed) and
the 䊐 plot (both employed). Therefore, a mean preserving
spread will move the expected marginal utility (the ⫹ plot)
down and reduce the optimal level of initial housing consumption. This is a graphical representation of precautionary saving.
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FIGURE 2.—IMPACT

OF

INCREASING H 1 ON
WITH 10% MOVING

LIFETIME EXPECTED UTILITY,
COST

1

0.5

du/dh1, both employed

du(h1,f1*(h1))/dh1

du/dh1, one unemployed
du/dh1, both unemployed

0

E[du/dh1]
-0.5

-1

-1.5
0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

h1
Note: This figure plots the marginal lifetime utility of first-period housing consumption against
first-period housing consumption, h 1 . The cost of adjusting housing consumption is 10% of h 1 .
First-period income, Y 1 ⫽ 2; second-period income for a given spouse is either Y 2 ⫽ 1 with probability
1 ⫺ p ⫽ 1 ⫺ q ⫽ 0.9 or Y z ⫺ L ⫽ 0.5 with probability p ⫽ q ⫽ 0.1. The correlation of the
household’s unemployment shocks is  ⫽ 0.2. As a result, total household second-period income is 2, 1.5,
or 1. Lifetime utility is given as the sum of log food and log housing consumption in periods 1 and 2.
Given these parameters, it is optimal to adjust housing consumption in the second period only if both
spouses become unemployed within the range of values for h 1 shown.

Case c: Adjustment is optimal only in the worst state.
When adjustment costs k are high enough to deter moving
in the face of small losses (one unemployed) and low
enough to make moving optimal in the face of large losses
(both unemployed), a precautionary dissaving motive is
introduced. Increasing risk now leads to more housing
consumption, inverting the standard precautionary saving
result.
This can be seen graphically in figure 2, which is identical
to figure 1 except for a 10% proportional cost of adjusting
housing consumption. Relative to the size of the loss, this
adjustment cost is low enough to make moving optimal if
both spouses become unemployed but high enough to deter
moving when only one spouse becomes unemployed.
The noteworthy feature of this figure is the extremely low
marginal utility of first-period housing consumption when
exactly one spouse becomes unemployed—the o line. When
exactly one spouse becomes unemployed, the household is
stuck in a house that is more expensive than it would prefer.
There is an imbalance between the high level (and low
marginal utility) of housing consumption and the low level
(and high marginal utility) of food consumption. Reducing
first-period housing consumption by $1 increases lifetime
utility in this event because it allows the household to
increase second-period food consumption, which has a high
marginal utility, by $2. The marginal utility of first-period
housing, the o line, is highly negative for households with
exactly one unemployed spouse. These households have to
reduce food consumption dramatically in the second period
because it is too costly to adjust housing consumption. They
would have been much better off had initial housing consumption been lower. This provides a strong motive to
reduce housing consumption in advance of possible single
unemployment.

When both spouses remain employed, the household
chooses not to move. Reducing first-period housing consumption to increase food consumption in the second period
(which has a low marginal utility) would decrease lifetime
utility. When both spouses become unemployed, the household chooses to pay a moving cost to rebalance housing and
food consumption; because consumption is low, the marginal utility of wealth (which will be spent on food and
housing equally) will be high, but lower (or not much
higher) than the marginal utility in the one-unemployed
state. Had initial housing consumption been $1 lower, both
housing and food consumption would be $0.50 higher in
this state.8
A mean-preserving increase in risk (increasing ) raises
the weight on both the unemployed and employed states (‚
and 䊐 plots) by reducing the weight on the one unemployed
state (o plot). Since the o plot (one unemployed) is substantially below the weighted average of the ‚ plot (both
unemployed) and the 䊐 plot (both employed), a meanpreserving increase in risk will move the expected marginal
utility (the ⫹ plot) up and therefore raise the optimal level
of initial housing consumption.
This setup implies a substantial positive relationship
between income correlation and housing consumption. In
the numerical example given in figure 2, increasing the
correlation of unemployment from no correlation to perfect
correlation increases optimal spending on housing by 2.9%
(and decreases optimal nonhousing consumption by 1.0%).
The saving rate falls from 3.8% to 2.9% when the correlation of income increases. This effect is similar in size
to—but the opposite sign from—what would be predicted
by a standard model of precautionary saving without moving costs. Without moving costs, the same increase in
income correlation leads to a 1.2% reduction in both housing and food consumption and an increase in the saving rate
from 3.3% to 4.4%.
Lemma 1 proves that increasing risk (formally, increasing
 or  holding p and q fixed) will raise housing and lower
food consumption. The net effect on aggregate consumption
(housing plus food) depends on the curvature of the utility
function (u hhh ), though it is strongly positive even for
quadratic utility (lemma 2, u hhh ⫽ 0) and log utility (figure
2, u hhh ⬎ 0). Unlike a setting without adjustment costs, it
is no longer sufficient (though still necessary) that u hhh ⬎ 0
for increasing risk to lead to greater saving. In addition, in
this case, increasing risk makes the household more likely to
rent because the compensating differential needed for the
household to accept the risk of paying the adjustment cost
k (as opposed to facing no adjustment cost) is increasing
with .
8 The increase is actually 50 cents plus half the nominal reduction in
moving costs. In this numerical example, moving costs are proportional to
initial housing consumption.
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Case b: Adjustment is optimal in all but the best state.
In this case, increasing  has no effect on housing consumption. It is optimal to make all adjustments in f 1 and not h 1 ,
and the household responds to increased risk by adjusting
food consumption. Since the household moves in all but the
best state, its goal is to minimize the wedge between
housing and food consumption in the event of the best
outcome. Adjusting h 1 commits the household to a larger
gap between h 2 and f 2 in the good state than adjusting f 1
would. By contrast, in the other states, utility is the same
whether adjustment takes place in h 1 or f 1 because the
household readjusts on moving.
Depending on the curvature of the utility function,
df *1 /d could be of either sign. However, there exists a k ⬎
0 such that df *1 /d ⬍ 0 for any utility function with u hhh ⬎
0. Absent wealth effects that come from the impact of
paying an adjustment cost on marginal utility, increasing
risk leads to reduced food consumption and increased saving.
III.

Data and Variable Construction

To estimate our model, we use two microdata sets. For
data on changes in employment status, occupation and the
probability of moving, we use the April 1996 panel of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which
follows a panel of households for 48 months between April
1996 and March 2000. When we examine the effect of
sharing an occupation on housing consumption and home
ownership, we use a pooled cross-section of households
from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the U.S. Census. These data
are a 1% random sample of responses to the U.S. Decennial
Census and contain self-reported house values, incomes,
and occupations, as well as employment status, a limited
moving history, and a number of demographic variables and
geographic identifiers.9
The SIPP initially contains 3,897,211 person ⫻ month
observations, and the three waves of the IPUMS together
initially contain 2,778,194 household-level observations.
We impose several restrictions on our samples, which, taken
together, reduce the number of usable observations to
307,154 household ⫻ month observations for the SIPP and
290,062 household observations for the IPUMS. These
restrictions are detailed in table A1. In both the SIPP and
IPUMS, we limit our attention to married couples in which
both spouses are currently employed. In the IPUMS, we
also impose the restrictions that both spouses work full time
and live in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).10 We
9 Since house value and income are recorded as ranges, we assign the
midpoint of the range, or 1.5 times the top code. All dollar values are
converted to real (2000) dollars using the CPI.
10 In the IPUMS, we discard households containing part-time or unemployed spouses because it is difficult to accurately measure their occupation or potential earnings capacity. In particular, one spouse might keep his
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TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS
A: IPUMS Summary Statistics
Owners Only
Variable

Mean

S.D.

Renters Only
Mean

S.D.

Husband and wife report same
0.096
0.294
0.096
0.295
occupation (1950 definitions)
Husband and wife report same
0.141
0.348
0.127
0.333
industry (1950 definitions)
House value; monthly rent
$175,893 $129,027 $666
$332
Family income
$91,252 $59,064 $61,777 $39,942
Husband’s imputed unemployment
0.065
0.022
0.071
0.025
rate (p)
Wife’s imputed unemployment rate (q) 0.135
0.038
0.147
0.041
Husband’s share of income
0.621
0.170
0.598
0.181
Imputed probability of moving
0.148
0.083
0.196
0.093
Sample average probability of moving
0.112
0.315
0.338
0.473
Number of observations
231,598
58,464
B: SIPP Summary statistics
Variable

Mean

S.D.

Husband and wife report same occupation
Husband and wife report same industry
Family income
Husband’s unemployment rate
Wife’s unemployment rate

0.031
0.091
$72,060
0.070
0.122

0.172
0.288
$57,647
0.256
0.327

Note: Panel A: Data are from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 IPUMS. Sample construction is detailed in
table A1. Dollar amounts are in real (2000) dollars. The number of observations for the “same industry”
row is 240,680 for owners, and 59,987 for renters. The sample size differs because a larger fraction of
the IPUMS sample reports their industry than do their occupation.
Panel B: Data are from the April 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, which
covers 48 months between April 1996 and March 2000. Sample construction is detailed in table A1.

restrict our attention to MSAs so we can control for local
housing costs.
We make extensive use of occupation data in both data
sets. The IPUMS reports one occupation variable with 227
categories that is consistently defined over all three waves,
based on occupation definitions from 1950. As detailed in
table 1A, the average rate of same-occupation couples
across all occupations in the sample is 9.6%. In the SIPP
data summarized in table 1B, the prevalence of sameoccupation couples is somewhat lower, at 3.1 percent, since
occupation definitions in the SIPP are more granular, with
463 three-digit codes. Table 2 lists the 20 occupations in the
IPUMS with the highest fraction of same-occupation couples. The fraction of same-occupation couples varies widely
by occupation: It ranges from 15% for physicians to 0 for
many occupations. The third column of this table shows the
distribution of occupations among same-occupation couples. These couples are drawn from a large number of
common occupations such as managers (28% of sameoccupation couples), teachers (13%), and clerical workers
(9%). High-socioeconomic-status professions such as physicians, lawyers, and professors are found in less than 5% of
these couples.
Consistent with the framework developed in section II,
our proxy for income risk will be unemployment. In the
SIPP, we define a person as employed when he or she has a
or her labor supply in reserve as a buffer in case the other spouse becomes
unemployed (Cullen & Gruber, 2000).
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TABLE 2.—TOP 20 OCCUPATIONS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

BY

PERCENTAGE

OF

COUPLES WHO SHARE

THE

SAME OCCUPATION

Occupation, 1950 Basis

(1) Same
Occupation Share
of the Occupation

Occupation Share
of Sample

Percentage of
Same Occupation
with Occupation

Physicians and surgeons
Teachers
Operative and kindred workers
Managers, officials, and proprietors
Lawyers and judges
Professors (subject matter unspecified)
Professional, technical, and kindred workers
Managers and superintendents, building
Real estate agents and brokers
Members of the armed services
Salesmen and sales clerks
Clerical and kindred workers
Janitors and sextons
Editors and reporters
Cooks, except private household
Policemen and detectives
Insurance agents and brokers
Mail carriers
Service workers, except private household
Social and welfare workers, except group

15.49%
12.30
12.14
11.55
10.65
7.85
7.58
7.40
6.81
6.08
5.61
5.11
4.85
4.61
4.46
3.60
3.39
3.34
3.13
3.05

0.52%
5.45
6.53
11.97
0.85
0.60
3.33
0.38
0.86
0.65
4.42
8.98
1.47
0.41
0.99
0.79
1.15
0.34
0.58
0.68

1.62%
13.33
15.77
27.52
1.80
0.94
5.01
0.56
1.17
0.79
4.94
9.12
1.42
0.38
0.88
0.57
0.77
0.23
0.36
0.41

Note: Only occupations comprising at least 0.25% of the sample are shown in this table. Column 1 presents the ratio of the number of same-occupation couples in an occupation to the number of couples where
either (or both) spouse has that occupation. Column 2 is the ratio of the number of couples where either (or both) spouse has that occupation to the total number of couples. Column 3 is the fraction of same occupation
couples with this occupation. Data are from the 1980–2000 IPUMS.

job all month or a job part of the month but spends no time
as laid off or searching for a job; we define as unemployed
a person who spends all month unemployed or has a job
only part of the month and spends some of the month as laid
off or searching for a job. In the IPUMS, we define a person
as unemployed when his or her stated usual hours of work
in that year are zero. Although we restrict our sample to
dual-employed couples, we control for the probability of
unemployment. We impute that probability for a husband
(wife) as the average rate of unemployment for husbands
(wives) in the same occupation and year, excluding the
husband’s (wife’s) own observation, imposing the sample
restrictions described in table A1 (except for the full-time
worker restriction).11 Table 1 shows that the annual unemployment rate for home-owning husbands ( p) in the IPUMS
averages 6.5% and the unemployment rate for wives (q)
averages 13.5%. The unemployment rates in the SIPP, 7.0%
and 12.2%, respectively, are similar.
IV.

Empirical Evidence

In this section, we test the empirical implications of the
theory developed in section II. Do couples with more highly
correlated unemployment events spend more on housing?
The model predicts that this will be the case when adjustment costs are high enough to deter moving in all but the
worst states. Otherwise the standard precautionary saving
result will be obtained: increasing the correlation of cou11 Since people who are unemployed may state that they have no
occupation—even when they have worked and plan to work in a given
occupation—this procedure likely underestimates the true unemployment
rate by occupation.

ples’ unemployment events will reduce housing consumption.
We implement this empirically by regressing log housing
spending, ln(H i,t ), on our indicator of increased risk (1),
proxies for low moving costs (k) or small potential losses
from unemployment (L) that we will denote by X i,t , and the
interaction of the two (1 ,i,t ⫻ X i,t ), for household i in year
t in the IPUMS data:
ln共Hi,t 兲 ⫽ ␣1,i,t ⫹ ␤共1,i,t ⫻ Xi,t 兲 ⫹ ␥X Xi,t ⫹ ␥Z Zi,t
⫹ ␦m,t ⫹ ␥XZ 共Xi,t ⫻ 共Zi,t ⫹ ␦m,t 兲兲 ⫹ ␥⍀ ⍀i,t ⫹ εi,t .

(8)

We include controls for other demographic characteristics
(Z i,t ) and MSA ⫻ year (␦ m,t ), Z i,t and ␦ m,t interacted with
X i,t , and also the occupations of the husband and wife (⍀ i,t ).
Standard tests of precautionary saving omit X i,t to measure ␣ ⫹ ␤ ⫻ X i,t , the relationship between risk and
housing consumption (or more commonly, wealth or saving)
for the average X i,t in the sample.12 A model of precautionary saving without adjustment predicts ␣ ⫹ ␤ ⫹ X i,t ⬍ 0;
12 These tests (including Skinner, 1988; Dynan, 1993; Carroll and
Samwick, 1997) regress individual-level occupation-based proxies for
income risk (1 occ,i,t , in contrast to our use of the household-level sameoccupation proxy for risk, 1 ,i,t ) on various measures of household wealth
(in contrast to our use of housing consumption). Other papers take a
similar approach in the housing context. Those empirical studies find a
negative relationship between income risk and home ownership (DiazSerrano, 2005; Haurin, 1991; Robst, Deitz, & McGoldrick, 1999). Prior
evidence on housing spending is ambiguous. Haurin and Gill (1987) find
that military husbands’ incomes positively affect their housing spending,
but their wives’ incomes (which they argue are more uncertain) do not.
Haurin (1991) examines the effect of income risk on house spending and
fails to find a statistically significant effect.
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increased risk leads to reduced housing consumption for any
X i,t . By contrast, our model predicts that ␣ ⫹ ␤ ⫻ X i,t ⬍
0 for high values of X i,t (for example, when moving costs
are low) but ␣ ⫹ ␤ ⫻ X i,t ⬎ 0 for low values of X i,t .
Equation (8) identifies ␣ and ␤—and therefore ␣ ⫹ ␤ ⫻
X i,t , providing a test of predictions from our model and from
standard precautionary saving models—so long as high- and
low-risk couples do not differ in their unobserved taste for
housing (E[ε i,t ⫻ 1 ,i,t ] ⫽ 0). We argue that this assumption is not only valid, but also much more likely to be valid
than the analogous assumption required for most precautionary saving tests.13
Since our model predicts that ␣ ⫹ ␤ ⫻ X i,t ⬍ 0 for high
values of X i,t but ␣ ⫹ ␤ ⫻ X i,t ⬎ 0 for low values of X i,t ,
it also predicts that ␤ ⬍ 0. For estimates of ␤ to be unbiased,
we need only assume that any difference in the unobserved
taste for housing between low- and high-risk households is
uncorrelated with X i,t : E[ε i,t ⫻ 1 ,i,t ⫻ X i,t ] ⫽ 0. We can
identify ␤ correctly even if the unobserved taste for housing
differs between high- and low-risk couples (E[ε i,t ⫻ 1 ,i,t ]
⫽ 0) or between couples with high and low X i,t (E[ε i,t ⫻
X i,t ] ⫽ 0). This weaker identifying assumption provides a
second test of predictions from our model.
To proxy for risk, 1, we use whether a couple shares the
same occupation. Same-occupation couples, as we show in
the next section, have a lower probability of just one spouse
becoming unemployed and higher probability of neither
spouse or both spouses becoming unemployed. We include
separate dummies to control for the direct effects of the
husband’s and wife’s occupations, ⍀ i,t , to exploit variation
in within-household diversification. Once we remove the
effect of either spouse’s occupation on housing consumption, does sharing an occupation further increase that consumption? In other words, do a dual-teacher couple and a
dual-realtor couple together spend more on owned housing
than two mixed teacher-realtor couples? Unlike papers on
precautionary saving that use individual-level occupationbased proxies for risk (1 occ,i,t ), including same-occupation
dummies allows us to identify ␣ even when risky occupations are correlated with unobserved taste for consumption.
In other words, our couple-level assumption that E[ε i,t ⫻
1 ,i,t ] ⫽ 0, which we need to identify ␣, may hold
after controlling for individual occupation, even when its
individual-level analog E[ε i,t ⫻ 1 occ,i,t ] ⫽ 0, needed to
identify ␣ in other papers, does not.
We use two different proxies for low adjustment costs,
X i,t , which will range from 0 (the highest adjustment costs,
where moving is optimal only in the worst state) to 1 (the
lowest adjustment costs, where moving is optimal given
smaller shocks). As we will show, this mapping of adjust13 Such papers assume that individual-level occupation-based proxies for
risk (1 occ,i,t ) are uncorrelated with unobservable tastes (E[ε i,t ⫻ 1 occ,i,t ] ⫽
0), an assumption that has been criticized (Browning & Lusardi, 1996;
Lusardi, 1997).
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ment costs to the propensity to move matches what we
observe in the data.
First, we compare home owners (X i,t ⫽ 0) to renters
(X i,t ⫽ 1), since home ownership involves greater costs of
moving. Second, we use an estimate of the expected length
of stay in the house, based on demographics (X i,t ⫽ expected probability of moving). This too is a proxy for the
moving cost, k. A household that anticipates more frequent
moving has a lower effective cost of a forced move. For a
household that is likely to move anyway, the cost of a forced
move is a minor shift in the timing of the move. If a
household was unlikely to move in the absence of joint
unemployment, the effective moving cost is the full moving
cost.
As a proxy for a low magnitude of the income loss due to
unemployment, L, we use the relative generosity of unemployment insurance (X i,t ⫽ 0 if UI generosity is in the
bottom decile, 1 otherwise). Access to more generous UI,
whether due to differences in the UI rules across states and
over time or nonlinearity in the reimbursement schedule,
makes it less likely that even dual-unemployed couples
would choose to move.
In the vector of controls, Z, we include the imputed
probability of each of the husband and wife becoming
unemployed since that affects expected income. We include
the product of these probabilities to control for the probability that both spouses would be jointly unemployed if their
risks were independent. The Z vector also includes the
squared unemployment rates for the husband and wife in
case the relationship between the risk of unemployment and
housing demand is nonlinear. We control for family income,
the share of the income earned by the husband, and dummies for the number of people in the household, the number
of children, the educational attainment of the husband and
wife, and the age brackets of the husband and wife.
A. Sharing an Occupation, Unemployment Correlation, and
the Probability of Moving

Before estimating equation (8), we present empirical
evidence that (a) sharing an occupation increases the correlation of couples’ unemployment events, so that 1 ,i,t is a
good proxy for  in the model, and (b) dual unemployment
dramatically increases the odds that a household moves
relative to single unemployment or dual employment. These
results indicate that our proxies for risk and moving costs
line up with case c of the model, in which moving is optimal
if and only if both spouses become unemployed, and therefore increased risk leads to higher housing consumption.
First, using the data from the SIPP, we estimate the
within-household unemployment correlation, controlling
for the observable characteristics, Z i,t , ␦ t , and ⍀ i,t , for
same- and different-occupation couples. The procedure is
described in appendix B. We find that same-occupation
couples face an increase in risk stemming from more highly
correlated unemployment. Over the course of a year, such
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TABLE 3.—PROBABILITY

Different
occupation
Same
occupation
Difference

OF

ONE

OR

BOTH SPOUSES BECOMING UNEMPLOYED AT SOME POINT DURING A TWELVE-MONTH WINDOW CONDITIONAL
INITIALLY EMPLOYED, BY WHETHER THE COUPLE SHARES AN OCCUPATION

(1)
Unemployment
Correlation

(2)
Probability
No
Spouses
Unemployed
During
Subsequent
12 Months

(3)
Probability
at Most One
Spouse
Unemployed
During
Subsequent
12 Months

(4)
Probability
Both Spouses
Unemployed
at Some Point
During
Subsequent
12 Months

(5)
Probability
Husband
Becomes
Unemployed
During
Subsequent
12 Months

(6)
Probability
Wife Becomes
Unemployed
During
Subsequent 12
Months

0.051
(0.002)
0.215
(0.023)
0.163
(0.024)

0.813
(0.001)
0.857
(0.005)
0.044
(0.005)

0.173
(0.001)
0.122
(0.004)
⫺0.051
(0.005)

0.014
(0.0003)
0.021
(0.002)
0.007
(0.002)

0.075
(0.001)
0.054
(0.003)
⫺0.021
(0.003)

0.126
(0.001)
0.110
(0.005)
⫺0.016
(0.005)

ON

BOTH

(7)
Number of
Observations
172,348
5,481

Note: The unit of observation is a couple ⫻ month. The sample consists of married couples who both report being employed in any given month. Same-occupation couples have the same three-digit occupation
codes. The columns are computed using the formula in equation EEE and the estimated unemployment correlations and probabilities from footnote FFF. All estimates condition on household income, the husband’s
share of the income, the number of people in the household, the number of children, age, education, and occupation of the husband and the wife, and year. Data are from the April 1996 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped using sampling with replacement and 200 replications.

couples are more likely to be either both employed or both
unemployed and are less likely to have just one spouse
unemployed, even controlling for each spouse’s occupation.
The estimates are reported in table 3. In the first column,
different-occupation households have low unemployment
correlations of 5.1% (with a bootstrapped standard error
of 0.2%), reflecting their within-household diversification.
Same-occupation households, by contrast, have a 21.5%
correlation in their unemployment risks, yielding a difference between same- and different-occupation couples of
16.3% (2.4% standard error).14 Same-occupation couples’
spread in risk can be seen in columns 2 through 4. Sameoccupation couples have higher rates of both spouses becoming unemployed (2.1% versus 1.4%) and both spouses
remaining employed (85.7% versus 81.3%), and lower rates
of just one spouse becoming unemployed (12.2% versus
17.3%). The differences between each of these are statistically significant. The overall rate of becoming unemployed
is somewhat lower for same-occupation husbands and
wives: 2.1 percentage points lower for husbands (column 5)
and 1.6 percentage points lower for wives (column 6).
Second, dual-unemployment appears to proxy for a “large
shock” because it dramatically increases the likelihood of
moving relative to single unemployment of dual employment. For the sample of couples in which both spouses are
employed in the current month, we estimate a probit to
predict moving over the following twelve months. As covariates, we include dummy variables for whether no
spouse, one spouse, or two spouses are unemployed in the
next month and also Z i,t , ␦ t , ⍀ i,t , and a dummy variable for
home ownership.
Table 4 reports the marginal effect on the probability of
moving from going from zero unemployed to one unem14 We obtain similar results if we restrict the sample to home owners. In
that case, the difference in correlation between same- and differentoccupation couples is 0.134 (0.025). We also obtain similar results if we
use the SIPP’s layoff variable rather than our measure of unemployment
or “same industry” rather than “same occupation.”

TABLE 4.—MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF MOVING OVER THE NEXT TWELVE
MONTHS, BY UNEMPLOYMENT STATUS

LHS Variable
Difference between one newly
unemployed and none unemployed
Difference between two newly
unemployed and one newly
unemployed
Occupation dummies?
Adjusted R 2
Number of observations

(1)
(2)
Moves in the Next 12
Months
0.027
[7.18]
0.063
[2.35]

0.025
[6.73]
0.062
[2.07]

No
0.1399
201,413

Yes
0.1861
183,430

Note: z-statistics are in square brackets. The unit of observation is a couple ⫻ month. The sample
consists of married couples who both report being employed in the current month. The columns report
the estimated marginal effects of the number of spouses jointly unemployed on the probability of moving,
estimated using a probit. The probability of moving measures whether there will be at least one change
of address during subsequent twelve months. All estimates control for home ownership status, household
income, the husband’s share of the income, the number of people in the household, the number of
children, age, education, and year. Data are from the April 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation.

ployed and from one to two unemployed. In the first
column, just one spouse becoming unemployed raises the
probability of moving over the next twelve months by 2.7
percentage points. If both spouses become unemployed, the
likelihood of a move rises by an additional 6.3 percentage
points over single-unemployment couples. Since the average annual moving rate is just 4.3% for dual-employed
home owners, dual unemployment yields an enormous jump
in the likelihood of moving.15

15 Since we do not observe unemployment severity, the realization of
moves after an unemployment shock is only a rough indicator of the
probability of crossing an S-s bound. Since some unemployment events in
the data have a larger effect on permanent income than others, they do not
correspond perfectly to the unemployment states in the model. In particular, a substantial fraction of unemployment shocks are temporary. As
such, the estimates in tables 3 and 4 will not map perfectly to model
parameters. Even if all households that suffer dual unemployment (as
defined in our model) move, it is not surprising that many household listed
as dual unemployed (but whose unemployment is very transitory) in the
data do not move.
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TABLE 5.—EFFECT

HIGHER CORRELATION IN UNEMPLOYMENT RISK
HOUSE VALUE, FOR HOME OWNERS

OF

LHS Variable:
log(House Value)
Same occupation [1]
Husband’s unemployment rate
[p]
Husband’s unemployment
rate2 [p 2 ]
Wife’s unemployment rate
[q]
Wife’s unemployment rate2
[q 2 ]
Husband’s unemployment
rate ⫻ Wife’s rate [p ⫻ q]
Z controls?
MSA ⫻ year dummies?
Occupation dummies?
Adjusted R 2

ON

LOG

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.043
(0.004)
⫺6.026
(0.271)
23.872
(1.580)
⫺0.098
(0.205)
⫺1.234
(0.707)
⫺11.313
(1.496)
No
No
No
0.2976

0.027
(0.003)
⫺2.290
(0.227)
6.804
(1.304)
0.455
(0.172)
⫺1.922
(0.586)
⫺6.554
(1.239)
Yes
Yes
No
0.3180

0.021
(0.004)
1.516
(0.375)
⫺8.089
(2.086)
0.213
(0.293)
0.460
(1.027)
⫺2.644
(1.282)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.3370

Note: N ⫽ 231,598. Left-hand-side variable is log(house value). See table A1 for the sample
construction. The Z vector of demographic controls in columns 2–4 include the log family income,
husband’s percentage share of the couple’s income, a vector of dummy variables for the number of
persons in the household, number of children, educational attainment of the husband and wife, and age
of the husband and wife. Data are from the 1980–2000 IPUMS.

B. Relationship between Income Risk and House Value

We examine the two predictions of our model: first, ␣ ⫹
␤ ⫻ X i,t ⬎ 0 for low X i,t (high moving costs) but not
otherwise, and second, ␤ ⬍ 0. To test the first prediction, we
must assume that same-occupation couples do not differ
from other couples in their unobserved taste for housing,
after including a host of controls (E[ε i,t ⫻ 1 ,i,t ] ⫽ 0). To
test the second, weaker prediction, we must assume only
that any difference between same- and different-occupation
couples in their unobserved taste for housing is uncorrelated
with X i,t (E[ε i,t ⫻ 1 ,i,t ⫻ X i,t ] ⫽ 0).
First, does greater risk increase housing consumption
when moving costs are high enough to deter moving in all
but the worst state? We begin by restricting our attention to
households with high moving costs: home owners. We
predict ␣ ⬎ 0; same-occupation home owners consume
more housing than otherwise identical different-occupation
home owners. These results are reported in table 5, where
we find that same-occupation home-owning couples spend
more on housing on average than do different-occupation
home-owning couples. Column 1 of table 5 reports the
results when the only additional covariates are the unemployment rate controls, log of family income, and the
income share of the husband. Husbands and wives with the
same occupation spend 4.3% more on housing (␣ˆ ⫽ 0.043,
with a 0.4% standard error) than couples with different
occupations.16 This positive estimated relationship between
16 While we generally treat the other estimated coefficients as nuisance
parameters, some persistent results bear highlighting. Consistent with
empirical precautionary saving papers that exploit occupation-level variation in unemployment risk (Carroll and Samwick, 1997, 1998), husbands
in occupations with high risks of unemployment spend less on housing
(the coefficient on the husband’s imputed unemployment rate ⬍ 0). We
also find that households that face greater occupation-based unemployment risk spend less on housing (the coefficient on the husband’s unem-
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“same occupation” and housing consumption, ␣ˆ ⬎ 0, is
consistent with our model but not consistent with a standard
precautionary saving model without adjustment costs.
By including additional covariates in this regression, we
can rule out many alternative reasons that same-occupation
couples may have a greater preference for housing. In
column 2, we control for MSA of residence in each year and
a host of household demographic characteristics. We find
that same-occupation couples buy houses that are on average 2.7% more expensive when compared to differentoccupation couples in the same MSA and same year. In
column 3, to control for the possibility that same-occupation
couples are more prevalent in occupations that have a strong
unobservable preference for housing, we add dummy variables for each spouse’s occupation. The new coefficient on
“same occupation” implies that after controlling for covariates, same-occupation couples spend 2.1% (0.4% standard
error) more on their houses than do different-occupation
couples. Since same-occupation couples have a 16 percentage point higher correlation in unemployment risk (from
table 3), simple extrapolation gives an elasticity of house
spending with respect to the unemployment correlation of
0.13 (0.021/0.16).17
Second, does greater risk raise housing consumption
more when moving costs are higher (␤ ⬍ 0)? In table 6, we
compare high- and low-moving cost households by interacting the same-occupation dummy variable with a proxy
for moving costs. In columns 1 and 2, we pool renters and
home owners together. The proxy for low moving costs is
whether a household rents, with X i,t ⫽ 1 for renters and
X i,t ⫽ 0 for home owners. Column 1 includes the full set of
Z i,t covariates and the ␦ k,t MSA ⫻ year dummies, all
interacted with X i,t , the dummy for renter status. Column 2
adds occupation dummies. The dependent variable is log
housing spending, defined as log annual rent for renters and
log annualized house price for owners. We annualize the
house price to standardize renters’ and owners’ housing
costs and calculate it by multiplying the house price by the
sample average rent to house price ratio. Errors in this
transformation will be absorbed by the renter dummy.
The first row of table 6 shows that same-occupation home
owners spend about 2.7% more on housing than do differentoccupation home owners (␣ˆ ⫽ 0.027, with a standard error
of 0.5%). The second row of table 6 reports that the
ployment rate ⫻ wife’s rate ⬍ 0). But our key finding is that these results
are attenuated or even reversed when the correlation of couples’ unemployment increases (the coefficient on same occupation ⬎ 0).
17 These results do not seem sensitive to our particular empirical choices.
We obtain essentially the same results when we use “same industry” rather
than “same occupation” as our proxy for couples’ unemployment correlation; control for other dimensions of similarity, such as age (in ranges)
and education; or split the sample by decade, running separate regressions
for 1980, 1990, and 2000. However, we find a significantly larger effect of
a higher correlation in unemployment risk on housing spending for
same-occupation home owners when the husband is under age 45, where
neither of the spouses has had any postsecondary schooling, or when the
household income is below the sample median.
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TABLE 6.—HOW

THE

EFFECT

OF

RISK VARIES

WITH

MOVING COSTS

AND THE

LHS Variable:

(1)
(2)
Log(Housing Spending)

(3)
(4)
Log(House Price)

Sample:

Everyone

Owners

X Variable:

X ⫽ 1 if renter, 0 if
owner

Same occupation
Same occupation ⫻ X
Z ⫻ X controls?
MSA ⫻ year ⫻ X controls?
Occupation dummies?
Adjusted R 2
Number of observations

0.027
(0.005)
⫺0.046
(0.010)
Yes
Yes
No
0.0863
290,062

0.022
(0.005)
⫺0.039
(0.010)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.0982
290,062

X ⫽ P(Moving)
0.046
(0.007)
⫺0.133
(0.041)
Yes
Yes
No
0.5353
231,598

0.033
(0.007)
⫺0.079
(0.041)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.5498
231,598

MAGNITUDE

OF

POTENTIAL INCOME LOSSES

(5)
Log(Rent)

(6)

(7)
(8)
Log(House Price)

Renters

Owners

X ⫽ P(Moving)

X ⫽ 1 if in Top 90%
of UI Replacement
Rate, 0 Otherwise

⫺0.057
(0.036)
0.157
(0.165)
Yes
Yes
No
0.1477
58,464

⫺0.038
(0.035)
0.175
(0.160)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.2127
58,464

0.073
(0.018)
⫺0.055
(0.019)
Yes
Yes
No
0.5575
156,285

0.027
(0.017)
⫺0.016
(0.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.5694
156,285

Note: Housing spending is defined as log annual rent for renters and log(house price ⫻ sample average(rent)/sample average(house price)) for owners. The Z vector of demographic controls include the log family
income, husband’s percentage share of the couples’s income, a vector of dummy variables for the number of persons in the household, number of children, educational attainment of the husband and wife, and age
of the husband and wife. The regressions in columns 7 and 8 also include state ⫻ year ⫻ X controls and report robust standard errors, corrected for correlation by state ⫻ year ⫻ being in the top 9% of UI replacement
rate. Data are from the 1980 through 2000 IPUMS except for columns 7 and 8, which use the 1990 and 2000 IPUMS.

difference in housing spending between same- and differentoccupation renters is 4.6 percentage points less than the
difference for owners (␤ˆ ⫽ ⫺0.046 with a standard error of
1.0%), yielding a negative relationship on net between risk
and housing spending for renters. This difference between
owners’ and renters’ response to risk is the pattern predicted
by a model with consumption commitments. When we
include controls for the occupations of the husband and wife
in column 2, the results are similar.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 6 present the results from
estimating equation (8) on a sample of home owners and
using the imputed probability of moving as the proxy for
low moving costs, X i,t . We impute the likelihood of moving
as the rate of recent moving by similar families. In the
IPUMS, we construct the average rate of having moved in
the previous year by husband’s age ⫻ husband’s education ⫻ presence of children cells. We define the bins using
ten-year age brackets, nine education categories, and an
indicator for whether the family has any children, and take
the average for all of the households in that bin excluding
the household in question. The covariates Z i,t control separately for each of the household attributes we use to impute
the probability of moving (age, education, and presence of
children), so X i,t can be identified separately from Z i,t by the
fact that the age profiles of moving vary with education and
offspring.
The first row of column 3 corresponds to home owners
with a zero imputed probability of moving—that is, they are
highly unlikely to move. Such households face the highest
moving costs, and same-occupation households in that category spend 4.6% (with a standard error of 0.7%) more on
housing than do otherwise identical different-occupation
households. For a household that was planning to move
anyway (X i,t ⬇ 1), the effective cost of a forced move is
very low; these couples should display the standard negative
relationship between risk and consumption. This is what
we find. As the likelihood of moving rises, reflecting a

more mobile household, the differential between same- and
different-occupation households is reduced (row 2). At a
probability of moving of about 0.35—a three-year expected
stay (1/0.35)—the estimated difference between same- and
different-occupation households disappears.18 And then,
as the probability of moving increases further, sameoccupation households are estimated to consume less housing than otherwise-equivalent different-occupation households. These highly mobile households have low moving
costs and thus behave like precautionary savers when faced
with an increase in risk. In column 4, adding occupation
dummies as controls does little except reduce the magnitude
of the estimated coefficients on the “same occupation”
variables by one-third.
Columns 5 and 6 of table 6 present results of regressions
identical to columns 3 and 4 for the subsample of renters.
Given the lower moving costs renters face, there is no
reason to believe that the probability of moving for demographic reasons would have any additional effect on the
relationship between “same occupation” and housing consumption. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the
estimated coefficient on the “same occupation” term is
insignificantly different from 0, so that the relationship
between “same occupation” and housing consumption for
renters is independent of their exogenous move probability.
Finally, columns 7 and 8 present results comparing how
the response to risk varies with unemployment insurance
(UI) generosity for the subsample of home owners.19 A
18 When X ⫽ 0.35, ⫺0.133 ⫻ X ⫽ ⫺0.046, exactly offsetting the
estimated coefficient on same occupation.
19 There are several sources of variation in the generosity of UI, which
we define as the replacement rate of the couple’s wages. While state UI
programs typically compensate the unemployed for up to 50% of lost
wages up to a cap, the level of the cap and the replacement rate schedule
vary across states, over time, and according to the number of dependent
children. In addition, the generosity of UI is a nonlinear function of
income: the replacement rate remains constant until income reaches the
cap, at which point it declines with income. Once income exceeds the cap,
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higher UI replacement rate reduces the effective size of
shocks to permanent income since it affords the unemployed the ability to set a higher reservation wage in their
job search (Feldstein & Poterba, 1984). A theory incorporating consumption commitments predicts that there would
be a positive relationship between “same occupation” and
housing spending only when the household couple experience a loss large enough to induce moving. As the UI
replacement rate increases, the odds of such a sizable loss
fall, and the difference in housing spending between sameand different-occupation couples should decrease (become
less positive). By contrast, a model of precautionary saving
without commitment would predict that same-occupation
couples would spend less on housing than differentoccupation couples and that gap should decrease (become
less negative) as UI becomes more generous and replaces
the precautionary function of the household’s own savings.
(This precautionary saving mechanism is described in Engen & Gruber, 2001.)
To test this theory, we interact an indicator variable for
the couple being above the tenth percentile of the UI
replacement rate with the same-occupation indicator.20
X i,t ⫽ 1 for those with relatively more generous unemployment insurance (low L) and X i,t ⫽ 0 for those with less
generous unemployment insurance (high L). We also control for the UI replacement rate dummy interacted with the
demographic covariates, MSA ⫻ year and state ⫻ year. The
standard errors are corrected for correlation by state ⫻
year ⫻ X.
The results are reported in column 7. Same-occupation
households that face low UI replacement rates spend 7.3%
the absolute benefit amount remains level at 50% of the cap amount but
is declining as a percentage of income. This nonlinearity in the replacement rate implies that the share of income earned by each spouse
influences the couple’s total replacement rate in the event that both
spouses lose their jobs. For example, if both spouses earn exactly the cap
amount and both become unemployed, they collectively will receive 50%
of their former wages. But if one spouse earns twice the cap amount and
the other earns almost nothing—total family income is the same but its
allocation across spouses is not—the family can at best replace 25% of
their former income.
To implement this proxy, we calculate UI replacement rates for each
spouse using the unemployment insurance calculator developed by Cullen
and Gruber (2000) and extended by Chetty. We are grateful to Raj Chetty
for letting us use his UI calculator and benefit data. Since the calculator
contains information about UI since 1984, we restrict our sample to 1990
and 2000. We then calculate the household’s replacement rate as the
average replacement rate for each spouse, weighted by their respective
income shares.
20 The tenth percentile household average replacement rate is about
15%. The replacement rate increases rapidly above that point to a
maximum of 0.5: the mean replacement rate in the bottom decile is 0.076
and in the top 90% of it is 0.352. In columns 7 and 8 we weight the
unemployment risk variables by the husband’s and wife’s income shares.
(The husband’s unemployment rate is multiplied by s and the wife’s by
(1 ⫺ s). The same occupation indicator is multiplied by s(1 ⫺ s).) We
also control for s and s(1 ⫺ s) separately. This weighting is necessary to
separately identify the UI replacement rate effect, which is a function of
the program rules and the within-household distribution of income, from
the distribution of income alone. In table 6, we report the coefficients on
the same occupation variables evaluated at the average s(1 ⫺ s), which
is 0.208.
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TABLE 7.—EFFECT OF SAME OCCUPATION ON THE DEMAND FOR HOME
OWNERSHIP AND THE IMPACT OF EFFECTIVE MOVING COSTS
(1)
LHS Variable

Own ⫽ 1

Sample

Everyone

X Variable

P(moving)

Same occupation
Same occupation ⫻ X
Z ⫻ X controls?
MSA ⫻ year ⫻ X controls?
Occupation dummies?
Adjusted R 2
Number of observations

⫺0.018
(0.005)
0.019
(0.027)
Yes
Yes
No
0.1942
290,062

(2)

⫺0.017
(0.005)
0.019
(0.026)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.2024
290,062

Note: Linear probability model where the left-hand-side variable takes the value of 1 if the household
owns its own home. See table A1 for the sample construction. The Z vector of demographic controls
includes the log family income, husband’s percentage share of the couples’s income, a vector of dummy
variables for the number of persons in the household, number of children, educational attainment of the
husband and wife, and age of the husband and wife. Data are from the 1980–2000 IPUMS.

(1.8% standard error) more on housing relative to differentoccupation households. This difference is attenuated when
UI becomes more generous. A same-occupation household
facing the higher replacement rate spends just 1.8% (7.3 ⫺
5.5) more on their house than an otherwise identical differentoccupation household. In column 8, we add separate occupation dummies for the husband and wife. While the signs
on the “same occupation” coefficients remain the same, they
are smaller in magnitude than in column 7 and no longer are
statistically significant.
C. Self-Selection

Because high-moving-cost households increase housing
consumption when income risk rises, while low-movingcost households do not, we can reject both the standard
precautionary saving model and the possibility that our
results can be explained by an unobserved taste for housing
among high-risk households. Suppose that same-occupation
couples had a higher mean unobserved taste for housing
than different-occupation couples, so their preference distribution shifted to the right. That form of heterogeneity
would cause same-occupation home owners to spend more
on their homes. But it would also suggest, counterfactually,
that same-occupation renters would spend more on rent.
We can also reject other alternative explanations for the
results presented in section IVC. Suppose instead that sameoccupation couples merely had a preference for spending a
lot on home ownership but not on rental housing. If that
were the case, they should also be more likely to own their
houses, which is rejected by the data. In table 7, we regress
an indicator variable for being a home owner on the “same
occupation” dummy variable (1) and also interact it with
our estimated probability of moving. Same-occupation couples actually are less likely than different-occupation couples to be home owners, a result that is strongest for couples
who are unlikely to move.
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If same-occupation couples had the same mean but higher
variance in their unobserved taste for housing than differentoccupation couples, it could explain more of the empirical
regularities we find. Since same-occupation households
would have thicker tails in the distribution of their preference for housing—they would either love housing or hate
it—same-occupation households who loved housing would
own and also spend more than the more neutral differentoccupation households. Those same-occupation households
that disliked housing would rent, and not spend much on
rent, relative to different-occupation households. In addition, depending on the clearing price of owned housing,
it is possible that more different-occupation than sameoccupation households prefer owning. In that case, sameoccupation households would have a lower rate of home
ownership. If this explanation were true, it would imply a
straightforward and testable prediction. The residuals for the
same-occupation, home-owning couples in the housing demand regression should be more right skewed than those for
the different-occupation couples. Similarly, the residuals for
the same-occupation renting couples in the rent regression
should be more left skewed. In our data, there is no distinguishable difference in skewness in residuals between
same- and different-occupation couples, so variation in the
second moment of unobserved taste for housing cannot
explain our results.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that any difference between same- and different-occupation couples in the taste
for housing is present only for households with a low
exogenous probability of moving or less generous unemployment insurance. UI generosity is determined by state
interacted with the within-household wage distribution. In
our regressions, we control for state and the wage distribution separately, identifying the UI effect using the interaction of the two sources of variation. Similarly, the probability of moving is determined by age ⫻ education ⫻
presence of children. Again, we control for each of these
covariates separately. It would be highly unlikely for houseloving households to be concentrated within one of these
subgroups. Furthermore, there is no reason that any such
effect would be limited to home owners and not renters,
which would be needed to reconcile columns 3 and 4 of
table 6 with columns 5 and 6.
V.

Conclusion

This paper shows that adjustment costs can invert the
usual negative relationship between risk and consumption.
The result is driven by the strong desire to reduce committed consumption in advance of possible shocks too small to
warrant adjustment relative to shocks large enough to make
adjustment worthwhile. An increase in risk that makes small
losses less likely but large losses more likely will then lead
to increased committed consumption.
We illustrated this idea in the context of a dual-career
household that faces unemployment risk and consumes

housing. This result requires adjustment costs to be high
enough to deter moving in all but the worst states. Therefore, it should not apply when moving costs are low, as they
are for renters or those who expect to move soon. We
exploit this feature of the model in our empirical tests,
which compare the effect of increased risk in settings where
moving costs are high to ones where they are low. This
comparison provides a test of the model that differentiates it
from leading alternative hypotheses.
When we proxy for increased risk—more precisely, a
higher correlation in unemployment risk—with whether a
married couple shares the same occupation, we find the
predicted pattern pervasive in the data. Controlling for each
spouse’s characteristics, including their individual occupations and probabilities of unemployment, we find that sameoccupation households spend relatively more on housing.
As expected, this result is confined to home owners and is
strongest for owners who face effectively higher moving
costs due to a lower exogenous probability of moving.
Finally, same-occupation couples spend relatively more on
housing consumption compared to different-occupation
couples when unemployment insurance is less generous.
In this paper, we focus on the role of adjustment dynamics in affecting the relationship between risk and the level of
consumption. The precautionary saving literature is concerned with the impact of prudence on the level of saving or
consumption but not on adjustment dynamics. We show that
adjustment costs can have a large effect on the relationship
between risk and consumption in both theory and data.21 Of
course, our finding that commitments affect the relationship
between risk and consumption does not deny the importance
of prudence in generating precautionary saving. It merely
follows from a difference in the precautionary motive in the
domains of large and small losses.
Our findings may also explain why precautionary saving
results are quite sensitive to the sample in which they are
measured (Hurst et al., 2005). Some papers find little evidence that those with more risk save more and spend less.
These include Dynan (1993) and Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992), who use household consumption variability
and expectations of household risk, respectively, as measures for risk. Other papers find strong evidence of this
relationship, including Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998)
and Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005), who exploit
individual-level, occupation-based variation in income risk.
Our results help to reconcile these varied findings. We show
21 This result is at the nexus of the precautionary saving, S-s adjustment,
and consumption commitments literatures. The consumption commitments literature examines the impact of adjustment dynamics on risk
aversion and not on prudence and the level of consumption (Chetty &
Szeidl, 2007; Browning & Crossley, 2004; Postlewaite, Samuelson, &
Silverman, 2006). The empirical literature on durable goods and S-s bands
considers the impact of shocks on adjustment dynamics but not on the
target level of consumption (Attanasio, 2000; Eberly, 1994; Bertola,
Guiso, & Pistaferri, 2005). Following Glossman and Laroque (1990),
portfolio choice has also been studied at length (Fratantoni, 1998, 2001;
Flavin, 2001; Flavin & Yamashita, 2002; Chetty & Szeidl, 2005).
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that results in the domain of individual-level risks to single
unemployment may be different from household-level risks
to dual unemployment. In the range of individual-level
losses, our findings mirror the standard precautionary saving result: couples in occupations with higher unemployment probabilities consume less housing. When the range of
losses is expanded to include household-level dual unemployment, holding total unemployment risk fixed, this result
is reversed.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs
Plugging the distribution of unemployment shocks from equation (6)
into the objective function from equation (5) yields the following objective function:
U共h 1 , f 1 兲 ⫽ u共h 1 , f 1 兲

(A1)

⫹ 共1 ⫺ p ⫺ q ⫹ 兲 max

冢

冢

共u共h1 , Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ 2h1 ⫺ f1 兲,
u共 21 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k兲,
1
2

共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k兲)

冣

u共h1 , Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ 2h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ L兲,

⫹ 共 p ⫹ q ⫺ 2兲 max

⫹  max

冢

u共 21 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k ⫺ L兲,
1
2

共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k ⫺ L兲)

u共h1 , Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ 2h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ 2L兲,
u共 21 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k ⫺ 2L兲,
1
2

共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 ⫺ h1 ⫺ f1 ⫺ k ⫺ 2L兲)

冣

冣

.

The first maximum refers to second-period utility in the dual-employment
state, the second to the single-unemployment state, and the third to the
dual-unemployment state. In case a (always move), the second argument
in each maximum is assumed to be greater; in case b (move only under
single or dual unemployment), the first argument is assumed to be greater
only in the first maximum; in case c (move only under dual unemployment), the second argument is assumed to be greater only in the third
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maximum; in case d (never move), the first argument is assumed to be
greater in each maxima.
Proof of Lemma 1: p, q 3 0 Optimal consumption. Relabel U(h 1 , f 1 )
as U(h 1 , f 1 , p, q, , k). The existence of u hh , u ff , u hhh , and u fff over the
relevant ranges of h and f ensures that u h , u f , u ff , and u hh are continuous
over this range. We ignore the values Y, L, and k that form knife-edge
cases in which the two arguments in the second or third maximum are
exactly equal (where the conditions for this are present below). These
cases occur with probability 0 if model parameters are chosen at random
within an arbitrarily small window. This implies that U(h 1 , f 1 )/f 1 ,
U(h1, f1)/h1, U2(h1, f1)/f1, and U2(h1, f1)/h1 are continuous in the
1
neighborhood around h1, f1 ⫽ 4 (Y1 ⫹ 2Y2); p ⫽ q ⫽  ⫽ 0. Consider the
solution to the system of four equations (which are straightforward to
calculate in terms of equation (A1)):

above, as k 3 0, the numerator converges to the numerator in case a.
Therefore, there exists a k ⬎ 0 such that df *1 /d ⬍ 0 for any utility
function with u hhh ⬎ 0 everywhere, since the numerator converges to a
value that must be positive if u hhh ⬎ 0. For larger values of k, depending
on the curvature of the utility function, df *1 /d could be of either sign.
1
df *1 /d ⫽ 4 k for u hhh ⫽ 0 (quadratic utility), though again this converges
to zero as k does. Note that df *1 /d in the quadratic case merely represents
1
1
a wealth effect, as 4 dE[ f *1 ⫹ h *1 ⫹ h̃ 2 ⫹ f̃ 2 ]/d ⫽ 4 k.
Case c: Move only in worst state:
dh *1
d

U共h 1 , f 1 兲/h 1 ⫽ 0

in four unknowns { f *1 , h *1 , h *1 /, f *1 /}. When p ⫽ q ⫽  ⫽ 0,
1
h *1 , f *1 ⫽ 4 (Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ) will be part of one such solution (as they solve the
first-order conditions described for an interior optimum described in the
first two equations); it is trivial to show that this is the global optimum
in the maximization problem. The implicit function theorem ensures
that there exists a ball for p, q, and  around p ⫽ q ⫽  ⫽ 0 such that
all solutions { f *1 , h *1 , h *1 /, f *1 /} for these values of p, q, and 
are arbitrarily close to the solutions when p ⫽ q ⫽  ⫽ 0. Therefore,
limp,q30 兵h*1 , f *1 , h*1 /, f *1 /其 can be found by evaluating this system of
equations at p ⫽ q ⫽  ⫽ 0. limp,q30 h*1 , f *1 ⫽ 14 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲. The
solutions for h *1 / and f *1 / in each of the optimal adjustment cases
are shown below. The ranges of k that rationalize these patterns of optimal
adjustment are given below.
Case a: Always move:

⫽

1
4

1

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ 2 k,

1

1

1

1
4

1

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ 2 k兲

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

冥

⫹ uh共 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 2 k ⫺ L, 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 2 k ⫺ L兲

uhh共 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲兲 ⫹ uhh共 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 21 k兲 ⫹ uhf 共 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 21 k兲

.

Note that the denominator is negative since by assumption, u hh ⬍ 0 and
u hh ⬍ u hf . The numerator will be positive if u hhh ⬎ 0 everywhere,
negative if u hhh ⬍ 0, and 0 if u hhh ⫽ 0. Therefore, dh *1 /d ⬍ 0 if u hhh ⬎
0 everywhere, dh *1 /d ⬎ 0 if u hhh ⬍ 0 everywhere, and dh *1 /d ⫽ 0 if
u hhh ⫽ 0 everywhere.
Case b: Move in all but best state:
dh *1
⫽ 0;
d

冤

册

df *1 1 g⬘共
⫽
d 2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

冥

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L ⫺ 21 k兲 ⫺ g⬘共
g⬙共

1
4

1
2

⫺ L ⫺ k, 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ L ⫺ k
1

uhh共 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲, 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲兲

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L兲
.

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲兲

As a result, d( f *1 ⫹ h *1 )/d can be expressed under separability as
dh *1 ⫹ df *1
d

1
2

冋

g⬘共

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L ⫺ 21 k兲 ⫺ 2g⬘共

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L兲

⫹ g⬘共
g⬙共

1
4

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲兲

册

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲兲

.

dh *1
d

冤

uh 共 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲, 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲 ⫺ 2L兲 ⫺ 2uh 共 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲,
1
4

共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲 ⫺ L ⫹ 2uf 共 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲, 41 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲 ⫺ L

冥

1
1
⫺ uf 共 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲, 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2 兲 ⫺ 2L兲
1
⫽⫺
.
4 4u 共 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲, 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲兲 ⫺ u 共 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲, 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲兲
1
2 4
1
2
hf 4
1
2
1
2
ff 4
4

⫺ 2 k, 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 2 L ⫺ 2 k ⫹ uh共 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲
1
2

1
4

1
4

Note that the denominator is negative. The numerator is negative when the
third derivatives are positive. To put this formally, when utility is separable and of the form u(h, f ) ⫽ g(h) ⫹ g( f ), then

uh共 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲, 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲兲 ⫺ 2uh共 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 2 L

df *1 1
⫽
d 2

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L兲

1
4

While the sign of this expression will depend on the concavity of g, note
1
1
that it is positive when g ⫽ 0 because L ⬎ 2 k. We know that L ⬎ 2 k
because if not, then adjustment would reduce both housing and food
consumption in the dual-unemployment state.
Case d: Never move:

⫺ 2uh共 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 2 k ⫺ 2 L, 4 共Y1 ⫹ 2Y2兲 ⫺ 2 k ⫺ 2 L兲

1

1
uf 共4

1
4

Again, the denominator is negative. The numerator is positive because
1
marginal utility is falling in consumption and 4 (Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ) ⫺ L ⬍
*
(Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ). Therefore dh 1 /d ⬎ 0. The general closed-form expression for df *1 /d is complex and uninformative, but under separability
when u hf ⫽ 0, and when utility is of the form u(h, f ) ⫽ g(h) ⫹ g( f ),
it reduces to

⫽

dh *1 df *1
⫽
d
d

冤

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲,

1
4

U 2 共h 1 , f 1 兲/h 1  ⫽ 0

u h共

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲, 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L兲
⫺
1
⫽
.
2 u 共 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲, 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲兲 ⫺ u 共 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲, 1 共Y ⫹ 2Y 兲兲
hh 4
1
2 4
1
2
hf 4
1
2 4
1
2

U共h 1 , f 1 兲/f 1 ⫽ 0

U 2 共h 1 , f 1 兲/f 1  ⫽ 0

冋

u h共

.

Housing consumption does not change in response to increased risk, .
Food consumption does. Again, the denominator of df *1 /d is negative.
By the same continuity argument using the implicit function theorem as

dh *1 df *1 1
⫽
⫽
d
d 4

冋

g⬘共

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲兲 ⫺ 2g⬘共
⫺ L ⫹ g⬘共
g⬙共

1
4

1
4

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ 2L兲

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲兲

册

,

which is positive if and only if g ⬎ 0. As in case c, the general
closed-form expression for df 1 /d is complex and uninformative without
separability.

COMMITMENT, RISK, AND CONSUMPTION
Ranges of k. Define ( x) ⬅ u( x, x). Note that since utility is strictly
increasing it is straightforward to define  ⫺1 (u) ⫽ x such that ( x) ⫽
u. In the limit as p, q 3 0, the following ranges for k characterize the
optimal pattern of moving as a function of k given Y and L.
Case a: Always move:
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f *1 ⫽ 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ⫺ 共 p ⫹ q兲 L ⫺ 共 p ⫹ q ⫺ k兲/4; so that
dh *1 /d ⫽ 共3共 p ⫹ q兲 L
⫹ 共 p ⫹ q ⫺ 兲共8 ⫺ 3p ⫺ 3q ⫹ 3兲k)/
共4 ⫺ 3p ⫺ 3q ⫹ 3兲2 ⬎ 0;

k ⫽ 0.

df *1 /d ⫽ k/4 ⬎ 0.
Case b: Move in all but best state:

Case c: Move only in worst state:

1
0 ⬍ k ⱕ 2 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L ⫺

2 ⫺1 共u共
1
4

1
4

h *1 ⫽ 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ⫺ 共 p ⫹ q兲 L ⫺ k兲/4 ⫹ 共共2 ⫺ p ⫺ q兲 L
⫹共1 ⫺ 兲k兲/共4 ⫺ 3兲;

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲,

f *1 ⫽ 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ⫺ 共 p ⫹ q兲 L ⫺ k兲/4, so that

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L兲兲.

dh *1 /d ⫽ 共4共2 ⫺ p ⫺ q兲 L ⫹ 共⫺8 ⫹ 32 兲k/4兲/共4 ⫺ 3兲2 ;
df1 /d ⫽ ⫺k/4 ⬍ 0.

Case c: Move only in worst state:

2L ⬎ k is sufficient (but not necessary) for dh 1 /d ⬎ 0. 2L ⬎ k can
be shown most simply by noting that the decision in the dual unemployment state to move necessarily means having a lower level of housing
consumption relative to not moving. So as not to be dominated, moving
must allow for a higher level of food consumption than not moving:

1
k ⬎ 2 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L ⫺

2 ⫺1 共u共

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲,

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ L兲兲

k ⱕ 12 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ 2L ⫺ 2 ⫺1 共u共
1
4

1
4

1
共Y 1
2

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲,

If k ⬎ 2L, then equation (A2) implies that f 1 ⫹ 3h 1 ⬎ Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 , which
is inconsistent with the optimal values f *1 and h *1 . Therefore, 2L ⬎ k so
that dh *1 /d ⬎ 0.

Case d: Never move:

1
4

(A2)

⬎ Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ⫺ 2L ⫺ f 1 ⫺ 2h 1 .

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ 2L兲兲.

k ⬎ 12 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ 2L ⫺ 2 ⫺1 共u共

⫹ 2Y 2 ⫺ 2L ⫺ k ⫺ f 1 ⫺ h 1 兲

1
4

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲,
TABLE A1.—SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION

共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲 ⫺ 2L兲兲.
Restriction

The three cut-off points are obtained by setting the indirect utility
from moving equal to the indirect utility from not moving for Ỹ ⫽ 2Y 2 ,
1
2Y 2 ⫺ L, 2Y 2 ⫺ 2L, respectively, and setting h *1 ⫽ f *1 ⫽ 4 (Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ).
Proof of Lemma 2: Quadratic Utility Lemma 2. Assume utility is
1
1
quadratic, so that u(h, f ) ⫽ h ⫺ 2 ␣h 2 ⫹ f ⫺ 2 ␣f 2 , ␣ ⬎ 0:
*
(a) When k is such that adjustment is always optimal, then dh 1
d

⫽ 0.

(b) When k is such that adjustment is optimal if and only if at least
*

one spouse becomes unemployed, then dh 1 ⬎ 0, but approaches
d
zero as p, q 3 0.
(c) When k is such that adjustment is optimal if and only if both
*
spouses become unemployed, then dh 1 ⬎ 0.
d

(d) When k is such that adjustment is never optimal, then

⫽ 0.

dh *1
d

Proof. Calculating U(h 1 , f 1 )/h 1 ⫽ 0 and U(h 1 , f 1 )/f 1 ⫽ 0, two
equations in two unknowns (h 1 , f 1 ), and solving this pair of equations in
each case yields:
Case a: Always move:
f *1 ⫽ h *1 ⫽ 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ⫺ 共 p ⫹ q兲 L ⫺ k兲/4, so that
df *1 /d ⫽ dh1 /d ⫽ 0.
Case b: Move in all but best state:
h *1 ⫽ 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 兲/4 ⫺ 共共 p ⫹ q兲 L ⫹ 共 p ⫹ q ⫺ 兲 2 k兲/
共16 ⫺ 12p ⫺ 12q ⫹ 12兲;

Data source: IPUMS
Original sample
Live in an MSA
Married
Husband and wife both age 25 or
over
Listed occupations
Husband and wife both work full
time
8 or fewer people in household
Not a farm household
Family income above 0 and not
missing
Both husband and wife have income
ⱖ0
Occupation not rare (contains ⬎ 200
persons/year)
Cell size for imputing probability of
moving ⱖ 30
House value or rent nonmissing and
⬎0
Data source: SIPP
Original sample (person ⫻ month)
Married couple households ⫻ month
Drop extended families
Husband and wife both age 25 or
over
Observe monthly change in
employment status
Family income above zero and not
missing
Observe continuous 12-month
moving history

Number Lost

Total
Remaining

1,016,455
779,536
63,992

2,778,194
1,761,767
982,231
918,239

20,499
572,470

897,740
325,270

1,513
2,318
113

323,757
321,439
321,326

1,160

320,166

17,806

302,360

185

302,175

12,113

290,062

3,117,752
160,775
137,147

3,897,211
779,459
618,684
481,537

173,786

307,751

597

307,154

Sources: 1980, 1990, and 2000 IPUMS; April 1996 panel of the SIPP.

201,413
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Case d: Never move:
h *1 ⫽ f *1 ⫽ 共Y 1 ⫹ 2Y 2 ⫺ 共 p ⫹ q兲 L兲/4, so that
dh *1 /d ⫽ df *1 /d ⫽ 0.

APPENDIX B: Calculating the Difference in
Correlations in Table 3
We use the following procedure to calculate the difference in correlation:
1. Using probit, estimate I UE,i,t ⫽ 1 ,i,t ⫹  Z Z i,t ⫹  ␦ ␦ t ⫹  ⍀ ⍀ i,t ⫹
 i,t separately for husbands and wives, where I UE,i,t is an indicator
variable for whether a currently employed husband (wife) becomes
unemployed at some point over the subsequent twelve months.

2. Estimate  i,t , and predict I UE,i,t 兩1 ,i,t ⫽ 0, and I UE,i,t 兩1 ,i,t ⫽ 1 for
each spouse (H, W).
3. Regress  H,i,t ⫻  W,i,t ⫽ 1 ,i,t ⫹ v Z Z i,t ⫹  ␦ ␦ t ⫹ v ⍀ ⍀ i,t ⫹  i,t
using OLS.
4. Predict  H,i,t ⫻  W,i,t 兩1 ,i,t ⫽ 0, and  H,i,t ⫻  W,i,t 兩1 ,i,t ⫽ 1.
5. Compute

冑I

 H,i,t ⫻  W,i,t 兩1 ,i,t ⫽ 1
UE

兩1 H,,i,t ⫽ 1共1 ⫺ I UE 兩1 H,,i,t ⫽ 1) IUE 兩1W,,i,t ⫽ 1 共1 ⫺ IUE 兩1W,,i,t ⫽ 1)

⫺

冑I

H,i,t ⫻ W,i,t 兩1,i,t ⫽ 0
兩1H,,i,t ⫽ 0共1 ⫺ IUE兩1H,,i,t ⫽ 0兲IUE兩1W,,i,t ⫽ 0共1 ⫺ IUE兩1W,,i,t ⫽ 0兲

.

UE

6. Estimate the standard errors by bootstrapping the previous steps
using sampling with replacement and 200 replications.

